Abstract: Housing property is the most important position in a household's wealth portfolio. Even though there is strong evidence that house price cycles and saving patterns behave synchronously, the underlying causes remain controversial. The present paper examines if there is a wealth effect of house prices on savings using household-level panel data from the German Socio-Economic Panel for the period 1996-2012. We find that young homeowners decrease their savings in response to unanticipated house price shocks, whereas old households hardly respond to house price changes. Although effects are relatively low in magnitude, we interpret this as evidence of a housing wealth effect.
Introduction
Owing to an increased activity on housing markets, the relation between the housing market and the economy as a whole has generated increased attention in the last decade. 1 According to the augmented life-cycle theory, a channel through which house prices and the economy are related is the stimulus of consumption and saving in response to windfall gains in housing wealth -the housing wealth effect. Due to the fact that immovable properties usually present the largest fraction of the national fixed capital stock, and the largest position in a household's wealth portfolio, dramatic downturns not only decrease housing wealth but also consumption, and this, in turn, might impact the overall growth rate, decelerate economic activity, and by implication, destabilize financial markets too. On these grounds, the goal of our paper is to examine whether there is a wealth effect of house price changes on savings on the German housing market.
Previous Literature on the Housing Wealth Effect: Even though there is strong evidence that house price cycles and saving patterns behave synchronously, the underlying causes remain unclear. Decreasing house prices may also lead to shrinking housing costs for tenants who in turn increase their non-housing consumption thereby offsetting the housing wealth effect in the aggregate. Consequently, the aggregate effect is likely to depend on the specific characteristics of the housing market to which the study is exposed to. Indeed, empirical studies making use of aggregate data, such as Case et al. (2012) ; Carroll et al. (2010) , or Calomiris and Longhofer (2012) , find heterogeneous effects. 2 The empirical evidence of the microeconomic relation between changes in house prices and saving behavior remains controversial too however. Whereas several studies based on data at the household level find empirical evidence in favor of a housing wealth effect, such as Skinner (1989) ; Campbell and Cocco (2007) ; Disney et al. (2010) , others find only little or even contradictory evidence, such as Browning et al. (2013) ; Attanasio et al. (2009) . 3 Beside the housing wealth effect, Campbell and Cocco (2007) suggest that the empirical relation may rather stem from common factors or financial liberalization that led house prices and consumption to rise simultaneously and may also depend on the consumption function that is used (Cristini/Sevilla 2014) .
Moreover, households should be neither liquidity nor borrowing constrained, as only those households who are able to increase their level of consumption by using their current level of additional savings or by reducing housing property as collateral are fully affected by unexpected gains in wealth (Campbell/Cocco 2007) . In order to generate income from own-occupied housing property, several financial vehicles exist, such as reverse mortgages, second mortgages or downsizing, which means that households gradually reduce housing space by selling. 4 Thus, in the presence of liquidity and borrowing constraints, indebtedness and a deficiency in incentives and possibilities to use up housing wealth, marginal propensities to save may vary significantly in strength, depending on the households' net wealth situation (Mian/Sufi 2011; Browning et al. 2013) .
In addition, owing to specific characteristics of housing, such as high transaction costs for searching and moving, financial and down payment constraints, housing wealth may not be treated as other assets within a household's asset portfolio. According to the behavioral life-cycle model (Shefrin/Thaler 1988) , wealth that comes along with high financial transaction and psychological costs may be held in different mental accounts, is framed differently, and by implication the households' marginal propensity to consume out of those assets might differ significantly. Hence, any windfall gain in non-fungible housing equity is unlikely to have any effect on consumption and saving behavior, thereby representing merely a "sideshow" (Skinner 1996:243) . Levin (1998) shows that responses in consumption behavior also depend on the composition of a household's wealth portfolio and that consumption is only less sensitive to changes in housing wealth. Additionally, Juster et al. (2006) find that savings respond more strongly to changes in corporate equities than to changes in housing wealth. Considering this two-sided characteristic of housing property, housing equity may be regarded predominantly as a consumption rather than as an investment good. In this case, any wealth effects resulting from housing capital gains should be only of secondorder importance even in the presence of the conventional life-cycle model (Buiter 2008) .
Although the old-age provision motive is the primary saving motive within the framework of the life-cycle theory, households' saving behavior exhibits additional saving motives, such as precautionary saving, the bequest motive, or the motive to purchase a house. Concerning the large degree of uncertainty, the precautionary savings model states that housing wealth is used solely as a selfinsurance preserved for the case of bad states during retirement. Thus, windfall gains in housing capital will decrease savings among young and middle-aged homeowners seeing as the increasing value of housing equity reduces the need for other kinds of precautionary savings (Skinner 1996) . Additionally, assuming that households are risk averse and losses are valued to a greater extent than gains, unanticipated changes in housing wealth will have asymmetric effects on saving 4 However, in Germany neither downsizing nor reverse mortgages are in widespread use so far. In addition, the "retirement consumption puzzle" states that in contrast to the implications of the life-cycle theory, households' non-housing consumption level drops with retirement age, whereas housing consumption increases monotonically and concavely (Yang 2009). patterns (Engelhardt 1996) . 5 As only a small fraction of homeowners have to tap into their housing equity during retirement, the precautionary savings model is also easily reconciled with the bequest motive.
Moreover, the relevance of saving motives is also changing along the life-cycle and by homeownership status, which in turn will reveal distributional effects, should house prices increase (Browning/Lusardi 1996; Schunk 2009 ): while tenants who wish to acquire housing property in the future will additionally face higher down payments and adjust their savings behavior upwards due to an increased savings target and an unchanged accumulation phase, own-occupiers may lower their savings (Browning/Lusardi 1996) . 6 Even without a strict incentive to purchase a house, young tenants face higher housing costs in form of higher rental payments if the arbitrage condition in the user-costs equation holds. Apart from the differences in saving behavior related to home ownership status, changes in house prices will also lead to heterogeneous inter-generational effects: if house price inflation stems from an unanticipated but persistent surge in productivity, young homeowners would likely respond more strongly to changes in wealth as they will benefit from these changes for a much longer time (Browning et al. 2013 ). On these grounds, Campbell and Cocco (2007) as well as Browning et al. (2013) question the degree of homogeneity and propose to differentiate the empirical effects by age cohorts as well as by homeownership status. 7 Empirical studies considering the German housing market are scarce. Hamburg et al. (2008) show empirically that changes in German private consumption can be predominantly attributed to permanent shocks to income rather than to wealth. 8 Thus, these findings are in stark contrast to previous findings from 5 Such a weighting scheme of gains and losses is consistent with prospect theory. 6 Artle and Varaiya (1978) extend the basic life-cycle model by adding the motive to purchase a house. They theoretically examine the effect of the housing motive on saving and consumption behavior under down payment constraints. By implication, the "down payment saving effect" for young tenants will be even stronger in countries with strong mortgage regulations, such as in Germany. 7 The study by Campbell and Cocco (2007) examines the response in household consumption to house price changes by means of a pseudo-panel constructed from household-level data from the UK family expenditure survey (FES). Their primary issue is to use micro data to distinguish wealth effects from other effects such as collateral, precautionary savings and myopic behavior in order to identify those households for whom the housing wealth effect is largest. Controlling for regional effects, changes in income, as well as for household demographics, they find the largest absolute effect of house price changes for older homeowners, and the smallest effect for young renters. 8 The study by Hamburg et al. (2008) contains financial wealth as well as residential housing wealth data stemming from 60 German cities. However, in contrast to the present paper, they Anglo-Saxon countries. As a consequence of substantial differences in the financial system and the institutional background of the housing market, notably in lending conditions, the regulation of the rental market, the homeownership rate, and the role of housing in retirement, German house price dynamics also differ widely in international comparison. After decades of stagnation, the German housing market is currently experiencing a positive surge in house prices, which has renewed interest in the extent to which changes in house prices and the overall economy are linked. The relation of house price changes and consumption respectively saving behavior is thereby of particular importance. Firstly, this is due to the fact that the increase in regional house price disparities is likely to grow in the future, owing to the ongoing structural change on the labor market with its re-urbanization tendency. And secondly, the demographic shrinkage, and notably the aging population, has a strong influence on the state pension provision, letting private retirement savings become more and more important for young households, and thereby adding to the importance of housing equity as an additional pension asset.
We concentrate solely on saving behavior in the rest of the paper for three reasons: Firstly, saving behavior is much more important in the light of current economic dynamics, such as an aging population and its influence on the state pension provision. Secondly, saving data is available in the survey data at a high level of accuracy stemming mostly from the diverse appearances of consumption. Thirdly, consumption expenditures seem to reveal a higher diversity. For example, housing capital gains may not be completely observable in non-housing consumption, seeing as an increase in overall consumption is also concealed by a rising housing quality (Gyourko/Tracy 2006) . Accordingly, estimates may be biased if one does not control for housing expenditures.
Research Question and Empirical Strategy: Against this background, this paper examines the marginal propensity to save in response to changes in housing wealth by the use of microeconomic survey data from the German SocioEconomic Panel (GSOEP), a representative sample of the German population. Contrary to previous work done on this subject, such as by Campbell and Cocco (2007) , which relies on pseudo panel data, the German SOEP is a true householdlevel panel data set with long temporal dimension. Our primary issue under consideration is whether evidence for the housing wealth effect can be found in German micro-data while controlling for common factors. More precisely, we regress the changes of households' saving rates to unanticipated and anticipated use aggregated data with the empirical methodology proposed by Lettau and Ludvigson (2004) relying on the consumption-wealth ratio. changes in house prices and incomes as well as to other household characteristics, such as education, socio-demographic characteristics, and liquidity constraints to overcome problems that are related to selection and identification. Following previous studies, we also differentiate among tenants and ownoccupiers as well as among different age cohorts to compare responses to house price shocks among younger and older homeowners. This may help to identify a housing wealth effect, even if there is a selection bias in effects regarding the homeowner and renter. With respect to the age-provision motive in the life-cycle hypothesis, we would expect the response in saving behavior to unanticipated house price shocks to be more pronounced for younger age cohorts. In contrast, a significant negative response in the saving behavior of young homeowners in combination with no significant response of old homeowners may be an indication of the precautionary savings motive.
The present paper improves upon earlier studies by applying a much more sophisticated method of examination of the house price process in order to differentiate among expected and unexpected changes in housing wealth using external regional house price data as a proxy for changes in property prices. Therefore, we merge regional house price data with the household micro data from the SOEP. Owing to the high persistence of house price changes as well as of monetary policy and demographic dynamics, we suggest using additional exogenous determinants to estimate the regional house price process. According to the behavioral life-cycle model, as well as due its dual characteristic, housing property may be primarily perceived as consumption good, and thus treated differently. In such a case, households are unlikely to perceive changes in wealth stemming from house price changes. For this reason, we use self-reported housing values to control for households' subjective perception of changes in wealth.
Empirical Findings: We find that an unexpected increase in house prices has a significant negative effect on the savings behavior of young homeowners, while young renters increase their savings in response to unanticipated changes in house prices. However, the response of young renters is not statistically different from zero. Accordingly, the results are mostly consistent with the implications of either the life-cycle model or the precautionary savings model. Furthermore, old homeowners and renters hardly respond to changes in house prices at all. The reason for this is unclear. However, the low utilization of second-mortgages as well as the fact that households do no tap into housing wealth with increasing age is at odds with the old-age provision motive. Notwithstanding this, the results might be in line with the precautionary savings model, particularly if the precautionary savings motive decreases in importance over the life-cycle, as recently suggested by Le Blanc et al. (2014) . In addition, we find that households only significantly respond to house price shocks which are unexpected. Thus, we conclude that highly persistent dynamics on the monetary market and in mortgage interest rates respectively, as well as regional developments in demographics (used in estimating the regional house price process) are likely to be anticipated by households and in turn included into households' saving behavior. Moreover, when controlling for households' subjective perception of changes in property values we find no systematic distortion that is based on socio-economic characteristics in any particular age. Thus, we can eliminate subjective perceptions of a changing housing wealth as a driver of the results. This is important, seeing as in Germany housing is traditionally seen as a consumption rather than as an investment good.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a more detailed description of the institutional background and the German housing market. Section 3 presents the methodology and the results for the estimated income and house price processes. The data from the GSOEP as well as the regional house price data used in the empirical analysis is described in full length in Section 4. Section 5 presents the empirical results, and Section 6 concludes.
Housing and institutional background in Germany
The relatively low rate of owner-occupied houses in Germany in comparison with other countries is to a substantial extent caused by the primary design of social housing that was brought forward by the German government by means of direct subsidies, guarantees, and tax-privileged housing construction given the shortage of suitable living space after the second world war (Voigtländer 2009 ). The relative liberal rental market, strong tenant protection, and fewer subsidies for the construction of self-occupied houses concurrently act upon the homeownership rate as well. Homeownership rates however differ widely among rural and urban areas: while in metropolitan areas only about 23 percent of households live in self-occupied houses, in rural areas this rate exceeds 50 percent. These differences are illustrated by Figure 1 . However, the share of own-occupied houses increases constantly. During the period from 1993 to 2002, the number of owners increased by 2.384 million households while the number of tenants rose only slightly (52,520). Hence, while only about 39 percent of all households lived in self-occupied property by the year 1993, this rate rose to 42 per cent in the year 2002, and to 46 percent in the year 2011. 9
Figure 1: Homeownership rates in % for German states. Statistisches Bundesamt.
House-financing takes place by means of mortgage banks which use the borrowers' property as collateral value for the mortgage loan. The German mortgage market is characterized by relatively strong borrowing conditions and the utilization of mortgage interest rates that are usually fixed over a period of 5-15 years. German mortgage banks finance on average an amount of 60-80 percent of the long-term collateral value which is commonly 10-15 percent beneath the purchase price. 10 Hence, households have to put up a comparatively large amount of equity. By implication, these strong restrictions in mortgage regulation also exclude low-income households from purchasing housing wealth. Furthermore, absolute housing values are relatively high as compared to international standards. This is particularly due to relative high-quality standards in building construction. On this account, German own-occupiers usually are "one-time buyers", thus only a few households increase their housing wealth by improving successively their housing property over the life-cycle. As a consequence of substantial differences in the institutional background, German house price dynamics differ widely in international comparison (Figure 2 ). In the period from 1994 to 2008, the German real house price index stagnated or even depreciated, while house prices in other countries, such as in the United Kingdom, United States, or Denmark 11 , experienced tremendous growth, developed more homogeneously, and additionally are marked by higher volatility. Kholodilin et al. (2010) in German house prices has long remained weak because of low income growth caused by a lackluster development of the economy and a relatively low degree of urbanization. Furthermore, one can argue that a decentralized planning system, such as in Germany, facilitates competition among municipalities and thus leads to a higher total number of building permissions. Moreover, Ortalo-Magne and Prat (2007) suggest that those countries with a high number of self-occupied houses tend to regulate housing supply more strongly in order to sustain growth in national housing wealth. However, the German housing market has been marked by significant growth since 2009. Current house price growth stems mainly from an increasing demand for housing which is caused by the positive surge in economic development, expansive monetary policy, changing risk awareness, and an increasing number of households, notably a larger share of middle-aged population (Kajuth et al. 2013) , as well as agents' expectations of future demographic developments and current differences in income (Bischoff 2012) . However, it ought to be noted that house price dynamics differ regionally. The migration pattern of the younger age cohorts shows a clear trend towards the big cities caused by an increased preference for urban amenities and structural changes in the labor market, above all an increasing knowledge-intensive service sector along with a shrinking employment in the industrial sector. The increased amount of disposable income as well as the positive surge in households in tandem with changes in the demographic composition led house prices to increase in urban areas with house price growth still being low in rural areas. 12 Furthermore, housing equity was traditionally considered to be consumption rather than as an investment good in Germany. 13 However, due to demographic shrinkage and the consequences resulting from the reform of the German pension system 14 , private retirement provision is rapidly becoming more and more important for young households and therewith housing equity as an additional pension asset. In accordance with the increasing rates of self-occupied houses, Helbrecht and Geilenkeuser (2012) find that there is an unambiguous tendency in young households' propensity to use housing wealth as an additional asset for private retirement provision.
An empirical model of saving behavior
The empirical model of saving behavior used in the analysis is based on an Euler equation deduced from the permanent income hypothesis. 15 Our empirical specification is thus similar to that proposed by Campbell and Cocco (2007) , and in line with the empirical model specifications recently used by Disney et al. (2010) and Browning et al. (2013) . The baseline model is given by eq. 1.
12 As households should only respond to changes in wealth that are unanticipated and permanent, the underlying causes of house price dynamics are of importance for the identification of a housing wealth effect. We use the findings of previous empirical studies instead of empirical statistics to validate that the current dynamics are of a permanent character. 13 Due to the "consumer good solution" in tax law. See Helbrecht and Geilenkeuser (2012) for more details. 14 "The reform [in 2001 ] moves the rather monolithical and very generous system that provides almost all retirement income within a single public pay-as-you-go-framework to a three-pillar system, in which private and occupational pensions will have an increasingly important role. Accordingly, the importance of private saving for old age has increased in recent years." (Schunk 2009: 468) . 15 As the analyses of Campbell and Cocco (2007) ; Attanasio et al. (2009) end up with opposite findings although the same micro-level survey data is used, the study by Cristini and Sevilla (2014) compares both studies in detail. They find out that the differences in estimates can be mainly attributed to the use of either a reduced form life-cycle model of consumption, as used by Attanasio et al. (2009) , or an estimated Euler equation model, as in Campbell and Cocco (2007) . However, they also state that a deeper understanding of the relative importance of the functional form of the consumption function remains unknown (Cristini/Sevilla 2014).
Hereby, s i,t is the log of total savings and r i,t is the risk-free interest rate of household i at time t. The vector Z i,t entails several demographic variables, such as age and educational level of the household head as well as the number of children in the household. Moreover, we control for region-specific effects + t , which occur at time t. u i,t represents the independent error term. E(By i,t ) is the expected change in disposable income of household i between t -1 and t, whereas ( y i,t = By i,t -E(By i,t ) represents the unanticipated change in disposable income that occurs from subtracting the expectation at time t -1 from the realized change in income at time t. 16 Accordingly, E(Bp it ) represents the expected change between t -1 and t in housing wealth, while (
denotes the difference between the realized and the expected change in house prices. All variables with a superscript j enter the regression without interaction term, interacted with a dummy for old, with a dummy for owners, and with both dummies simultaneously. Thus, we allow for heterogeneous saving behavior among subgroups and consequently, for different effects.
Furthermore, selection issues must be addressed when examining saving responses to house price shocks among tenants and homeowners on the basis of panel data. First of all, there is the problem of endogenous selection. Synthetic panel data sets are subject to the problem that cohort compositions do not reflect representative, i.e. randomly drawn, samples of the total population. For example, the homeownership status of a survey wave depends on the level of income and the house prices prevailing at that time. Any such endogenous selection leads to biased estimators. The use of a true panel structure with a relatively long time dimension, however, permits us to disregard the temporal cohort effects that lead to distorted group compositions in a synthetic panel data setting (Browning et al. 2013) . 17 While a true panel with long time dimension helps to control for endogenous selection, the problem of self-selection remains. Since the decision whether to rent or buy is not independent of socio-economic characteristics, e.g. the social environment and education, self-selection leads to distorted cohort samples with increasing household age (starting at the latest from the age at which the question of homeownership becomes relevant). 18 This makes it more difficult to clearly identify responses to house price shocks. However, our data set 16 As income changes correlate with changes in housing prices, one has to control for expected as well as unexpected changes in income. 17 See Cristini and Sevilla (2014), or Browning et al. (2013) for a detailed discussion. 18 A household is classified as an owner if the household head owns the dwelling the household lives in and/or if the household head owns further property. A household is classified as a renter if the household head does neither have own-occupied nor further property. Households that both rent and own a house/an apartment are excluded from the analysis. Note that households may switch from renter to homeowner or vice versa over time.
makes it possible to differentiate effects for different cohorts, according to age and status of homeownership, such that a distinction can be made between cohorts in the decision phase and long-term tenants and owners. This should minimize the distortion caused by self-selection, albeit for the fact that remaining selection cannot be completely precluded.
Changes in wealth cannot only occur due to active saving. Real wealth can also change due to passive saving which occurs if there are real capital gains or losses on existing assets in the household's portfolio. We abstract from including a direct measure of passive savings in our empirical model due to two concerns at least: firstly, as we control for changes in the risk-free interest rate reflecting the opportunity costs of holding assets, such as stocks, much of the variation in passive saving is already accounted for. Secondly, whereas house prices are largely driven by regional determinants, the structure of households' asset portfolios is likely to be spatially homogeneous. On these grounds, much of the changes in returns on other financial assets, such as bonds and stocks, are therewith controlled for by the time dummies in the estimation.
The processes for income and house prices have to be estimated separately under the consideration of several concerns. While the income process and the empirical Euler equation are estimated at the individual level, the house price process is estimated at the regional level. To form household-specific expectations on house price changes, we match individual locations with regions. The method of derivation of these processes are described in detail in the next subsections. The estimation results of the empirical Euler equation are discussed at length in Section 5.
House price process
The estimation of the house price process should be closely related to the way households form their expectations. Conventional life-cycle theory suggests that agents form rational expectations in a forward looking manner. This rational expectation hypothesis implies that households predict future house prices with the knowledge of how the sub-markets' economy is structured and how market players' behavior is interrelated. However, in the last decades, several publications in stock market research showed that expected returns move equably with the current performance of the stock market, and thus are not consistent with the rational expectation hypothesis. In consequence, the rational expectation formation in a forward-looking manner has been discarded increasingly in favor of near-rational, moving-average, or extrapolation expectation formation, notably because of the costly accessibility and availability of information. Just recently, Greenwood and Shleifer (2014) discard the rational expectation formation in favor of extrapolation techniques to model investors' expectations. By the same token, affirmative evidence has been found by related references from housing market research as well. By means of survey data, Case and Shiller (1990) ; Piazzesi and Schneider (2009) demonstrate that home buyers expect higher long-term house price appreciation if the underlying market reveals a strong increase in value at the same time. Furthermore, Gelain and Lansing (2014) confirm existing evidence by pointing out that a simple moving-average forecast rule is able to cover all the features of survey studies. Unfortunately, for Germany neither an equivalent study nor an equivalent survey data set exists. Owing to high search costs, market imperfections, and the unfamiliarity with market structure, evidence from previous literature bears out that agents in the housing market might likely be tempted to rely on past prices to form expectations. 19 Taking into consideration the previous findings from international survey data, we assume that households use past prices and simple autoregressive models in order to describe the stochastic process of house prices, and accordingly, to distinguish between unanticipated and anticipated changes. Moreover, we use permanent drivers of house price growth that have been previously identified by German house price studies, discussed in more detail in Section 2, in order to control for anticipated and unanticipated changes in exogenous fundamentals that affect long-term developments in house prices. On these grounds, we control for dynamics in fundamentals that are likely to be anticipated by households. The baseline model which represents the specified house price process is given as follows:
Whereby p r, t is the natural log of the regional house price index in region r at time t; r ∈ [1, .., R] indexes the regional housing market areas. 20 Accordingly, 1 represents the coefficient of the temporal lag of the dependent variable. The 19 Recently, empirical studies considering housing wealth effects make use of simple autoregressive models. Just recently, Browning et al. (2013) use a simple first-order autoregressive model to model the house price process. Moreover, Disney et al. (2010) make use of a secondorder autoregressive model to deduce unanticipated house price effects on a county-level basis. Campbell and Cocco (2007) also control for unpredictable changes in house prices by the use of instrumental variables. For this purpose, they use the second lag of house price changes as an instrument. Attanasio et al. (2009) analyze the effect of unexpected house price changes, but do not state any equation of the used specification nor empirical results. 20 As we do not have regional house price data for all 97 spatial planning regions in Germany, regressions are restricted to a subsample of regions. All housing market areas used are listed in vector H represents the number of households, mr the nominal 10-year mortgage rate, and Y the GDP. 21 In addition, we control for time-invariant, individual fixed effects that belong to the single regions, , r , and for time-variant effects, 4 t , that vary over time but not over the considered regions. We use temporal lags to control for the temporal autoregression representing the high persistence in the underlying variables. In order to control for endogeneity, we estimate the fixed effects dynamic panel model by the generalized method of moments estimation procedure proposed by Blundell and Bond (1995) . 22 The estimation results are presented in Table 1 . The estimated coefficients of the exogenous variables have the expected signs and are statistically significant. We decide to use specification 2 containing only the temporal lags of the regional household number and the regional gross domestic product in order to avoid any endogeneity problems. In conclusion, changes in housing wealth can be assigned to an anticipated and an unanticipated part both of which are deduced from an estimated house price process: (
The actual as well as the derived expected and unexpected changes in average house prices are illustrated in Figure 3. 
Subjective perception of changing house prices
Households may not be able to perceive changes in housing wealth due to the difficulty of measuring changes in house prices caused by high search costs and Table 10 . Regional trends in economic key variables, i.e. the number of households and income, are representative for trends in all German housing market areas. 21 Variables are defined in detail in table 11. Due to multicollinearity issues, we keep the set of variables simple. 22 The lags of the dependent variable are used as additional GMM instruments. For the estimation, a two step procedure with regenerated weighting matrix with time dummies and fixed effects is used. In addition, robust standard errors are used for deriving inferences. informational asymmetries. Additionally, according to the behavioral life-cycle model as well as to the duality characteristic of housing, changing housing values may be perceived, but treated differently within a household's wealth portfolio. In order to prevent that the housing wealth effect is solely a question of subjective perception, there is a need to control for households' subjective perception of changing house prices and appropriate measuring. Individual housing capital gains can be either measured by the deflated transaction price, comparable house prices based on regional indexes, or self-reported values of the housing property. However, according to Engelhardt (1996) measuring real housing capital gains is difficult due to a lack of adequate data. Against this backdrop, Browning et al. (2013) suggest that households assess changes in their housing wealth using past transaction prices of dwellings in their municipality. However, the use of regional price indexes does not consider the whole heterogeneity of houses and its intraregional differences in appreciation. A large amount of intra-regional variation in appreciation rates stems from influences that are caused by the individual property itself, such as physical deterioration, individual redevelopment, and maintenance efforts, as well as its immediate surrounding, and moving behavior (Archer et al. 1996; Engelhardt 1996; Disney et al. 2010) . On the contrary, individual self-reported values might be biased as well as they encompass individual beliefs and household's individual perception of changes in housing wealth. In order to control for household's subjective perception without neglecting possible heterogeneity in intraregional house price dynamics, we form a perception dummy variable which is one if there is at least one change in self-reported housing values over the years 2002, 2007, and 2012 , and which is zero otherwise, although the actual regional house price index has changed over the respective years. 23 The perception dummy is included in the baseline regression to verify the robustness of our results.
Income process
In this subsection we estimate the income process in order to derive predictions of expected and unexpected income changes. We assume that households expect their incomes for the next period to be strongly related to the income in the past period. Thus, we follow the tradition in economic life-cycle models where the income process is most often modeled as a simple first order autoregressive process (AR(1)) plus a transitory shock (Hubbard et al. 1995; Huggett 1996) . The base-line model is given as follows:
The dependent variable, y i,t , is the natural log of current yearly household net income deflated to 2006 Euro. It is the income that is disposable after deduction of tax and national insurance contributions. Regular payments such as rent subsidy, child benefit, government grants, subsistence allowances, amongst others, are included. Explanatory variables include the lag of the households net income, y i,t-1 , and a vector of household characteristics, z i,t , namely the household heads' log age as well as log age squared and the number of children in the household. Moreover, eq. 3 contains household-specific fixed effects that are constant over time, , i , and time fixed effects, * t , which vary over time but do not vary over the considered households. * t contains year dummies so that we control for year-specific common national shocks. Lastly, u i,t is an independent error term. 24 The income process is estimated using the Arellano Bover linear dynamic panel-data estimator. The estimation results are shown in Table 2 . The autoregressive parameter estimate is 0.33 and all coefficients are highly significant.
23
The dummy variable is formally defined as follows: 2002, 2007, 2012 ] | i ∈ HO 1, Else whereby, [2002, 2007, 2012] is the interval of measuring points in time, i indexes an individual household, and p sr i, t represents the self-reported house price, respectively. 24 The data are extracted from the GSOEP and is presented in Section 4. Notes: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The regression includes year dummies which are not reported. Standard errors in parentheses. GSOEP, own calculations.
As described above, based on the estimation results, we calculate expected and unexpected income changes which are then used in the total savings equation.
Data
We use household level longitudinal data taken from the GSOEP. The GSOEP is a repeated panel survey of around 12,000 private households in the Federal Republic of Germany and has been conducted annually since 1984. The panel contains detailed information on savings, wealth, income, and on personal as well as household characteristics. 25 We utilize 18 waves of data (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) to investigate the period from 1996 to 2012. The information used is confined to this period due to limited availability of external house price data.
Saving
Following Engelhardt (1996); Juster et al. (2006); Disney et al. (2010) , we use household active saving as dependent variable. By using household saving instead of household consumption we rule out estimates biased due to ignored changes in housing consumption. 26 Active saving is defined as the fraction of current income that is not used for consumption but for asset purchases, thus raising financial wealth (Engelhardt 1996; Disney et al. 2010 ). The precise form of the question that each individual aged 17 years and older in the household answers is: "Do you usually have money left over at the end of the month that you can put aside for larger purchases, emergencies, or to build savings? If so, how much?". Household active saving is the sum of these saving amounts across all household members. We deflate active saving to the year 2006 using the consumer price index (CPI). Summary statistics on active saving by homeownership status for each wave of 1996 to 2012 are reported in Table 3 . One can observe that the fraction of homeowners that saves, 71 percent, is significantly larger than that of renters, which only amounts to 54 percent. Besides, the average monthly amount of savings of homeowners, 308 Euro, is more than twice as large as that of renters, 146 Euro. This observation is confirmed by the savings rate which is defined as mean active saving divided by mean income, thus controlling for possible differences in income for owners and renters: it amounts to 12 percent for homeowners and to 9 percent for renters.
The savings rate does not only differ among owners and renters but also among age cohorts. Young and old households are defined as having a household head aged 40 or younger and aged over 40, respectively. Figure 4 shows saving rates by homeownership status of young and old households during the sample period. One can see that old homeowners by far have the largest savings rate lying between 12 to 14 percent, meaning that old homeowners save the highest amount relative to their income. 
Wealth
The GSOEP provides us with information on household wealth for the years 2002, 2007, and 2012 . Total household wealth in the GSOEP is composed of eight components: owner-occupied property, other property (both including debts), financial assets, building loan contracts, private insurances, business assets, tangible assets, and consumer debts. Total net wealth in each of the 2002, 2007, and 2012 waves of the GSOEP is the sum of all wealth components, i.e. gross wealth minus liabilities in the respective year. 27 It can also be written as the sum of net housing wealth and net non-housing wealth, where net housing wealth is defined as the sum of net owner-occupied property and net other property. Net non-housing wealth is simply the sum of the six remaining wealth components. Summary statistics on net housing wealth, net non-housing wealth, and total net wealth for the years 2002, 2007, and 2012 for the whole sample and by homeownership status are displayed in Tables 4 and 5, respectively. 27 Total net wealth is likely to be underreported in the GSOEP and below net wealth estimated from national accounts due to the fact that overall wealth in the GSOEP excludes wealth components like cars, furniture and pension entitlements. As our interest lies in relative differences which are very similar across different data sources, this is likely to play a minor role in the present analysis. Source: GSOEP, own calculations. Average net household wealth amounts to approximately 150,000 Euro in 2002, 2007, and 2012 . Of this, housing wealth is by far the most important wealth component of German households: approximately 62 percent of total net wealth is held as housing wealth (Table 4 ). In the years considered, the average value of net housing equity for homeowners amounts to approximately 220,000 Euro and their average value of total net wealth amounts to around 300,000 Euro ( Table 5 ). Given that in Germany housing wealth plays such an important role in the wealth accumulation process, it is not surprising that homeowners are much wealthier than renters. The average value of total net wealth for renters only adds up to around 18,000 Euro, thus being more than ten times lower than that of homeowners. Homeowners have a ratio of mean wealth to mean income which lies between 9 to 10 in 2002, 2007, and 2012 , whereas that of renters only amounts to around 0.9.
House prices
For the estimation of the house price process, we use a panel dataset that contains house price indexes of 62 metropolitan areas on its cross-sectional dimension and that covers a period from 1995-2012. 28 The bold grey dashed line in Figure 5 displays the changes in these house price indexes for all 62 metropolitan areas used in the analysis. The bold black line displays changes in house price indexes for the top seven cities only and the dashed lines display changes in regional house price 28 Regional house price data are obtained from the BulwienGesa AG, leading provider for house price data. The data is also used by the Deutsche Bundesbank among others.
indexes based on single-family houses. 29 In contrast to Browning et al. (2013) we do not use micro data based on transactions, rather we rely on quality-adjusted regional house price indexes (prices per square meter) that are also based on transaction data. Apart from using aggregated regional house price data, we also use households' self-reported home values from the GSOEP to control for subjective perception of changes in property values. This distinguishes our study from earlier ones (Campbell/Cocco 2007; Attanasio et al. 2009 ), which have relied on aggregate house price information only. 30 As mentioned above, the GSOEP provides detailed information on housing wealth for the years 2002, 2007, and 2012 . In these years, homeowners report the annual estimate of the current market value of the housing property they live in and the annual estimate of the current market value of other housing or land properties. Additionally, they report outstanding mortgage debt for both types of property, so that data on gross and net housing wealth is available.
Empirical evidence
This section is devoted to examine the link between anticipated and unanticipated house price changes and household saving behavior while controlling for a set of common factors including anticipated and unanticipated income changes among others, as well as for socio-economic variables. 31
Baseline regression
In this subsection, we present results from our baseline model (1). The empirical model is estimated by pooled OLS for the period from 1996 to 2012. 32 All standard errors are robust. In contrast to Browning et al. (2013) our regression sample is 29 The data stem from the German Federal Institute for Research on Buildung, Urban Affair and Spatial Development. As the data are limited to the period from 2005 to 2010, we abstract from using it for our analysis. 30 The great advantage of self-reported house price changes is that the households' perception of a housing capital gain or loss is more informative about saving behavior than those gains or losses actually realized. 31 Following Browning et al. (2013) , we present a set of basic regressions in Table 12 to provide a first idea of the relation between the main variables used in the total saving equation. 32 Household specific fixed effects are eliminated due to the estimation in first differences. not restricted to homeowners, but also contains renters. Estimation results are reported in Table 6 . 33 It is striking that nearly all parameter estimates of unanticipated house price shocks are statistically significant, whereas those of anticipated house price shocks are not. Hence, as suggested by the life-cycle hypothesis, households solely respond to unexpected house price changes, so that we restrict our interpretation to the effects of unanticipated house price changes on savings behavior. 34 The fact that households anticipate highly persistent economic dynamics, using mortgage interest rates and regional demographic developments to estimate household's expectations of house prices, might also explain the rather small effects in household's saving responses to unanticipated shocks.
The baseline group in the regression is young renters, so that the estimated coefficient on( p it measures the effect of unanticipated house price changes on savings of young renters. The parameter estimates of the interaction terms measure the additional effects of unanticipated house price shocks on savings for the particular subgroups defined by the dummy variables. Our results as well as the reported Wald tests (2) at the bottom of Table 6 reveal significant heterogeneity in the savings responses to unanticipated house price changes across the different groups.
For young renters, we find a positive relationship between unanticipated house price shocks and saving behavior: a one percent increase in house prices that was not anticipated by households is associated with a 0.003 percent increase in savings. This result is consistent with the basic life-cycle model with old-age provision saving motive, since an increase in house prices leads to an increase in the price of future housing needs. It can be attributed to the "down payment saving motive". Either young renters plan to acquire housing property in the future and will face higher down payments as the accumulation phase remains constant but the target increases (housing purchase motive), or they continue to rent and face higher rental payments if the arbitrage condition in the user-costs holds. However, the parameter estimate is not significantly different from zero. Old renters do not appear to react to unanticipated house price changes (( old) . According to the basic life-cycle theory, we would have expected that old renters increase their savings, although by less than young renters. However, there are several restrictions which reconcile the response of old renters with theory: Rent increases for elderly people are limited to a certain fixed amount 33 The estimated coefficients of income changes can be found in Table 13 . Other parameter coefficients will be provided upon request. 34 Note, however, that the sum of the coefficients of the unanticipated house price changes is not significantly different from zero (see Wald tests (1) in Table 6 ).
and their housing demand rather decreases due to reduced family size. For young homeowners (( p it +( p it , ho), we observe a negative statistically significant relationship between unanticipated house price shocks and saving behavior: a one percent increase in house prices is associated with a 0.003 decrease in savings. This is the response we would have expected according to the life-cycle theory of consumption. Young homeowners benefit from an increase in housing wealth. In order to keep the marginal utility of consumption constant over the life-time, they decrease their savings.
The conventional life-cycle model suggests that old homeowners should also decrease their savings and by an even larger amount than younger ones. This is due to the fact that increasing house prices do not only generate increasing housing wealth but also lead to an increase in the price of future housing needs for homeowners. Given the shorter remaining life-time, old homeowners are less affected by these higher prices. However, we do not find any reaction of old homeowners to unanticipated house price shocks (( old, ho) . 35 The low utilization of second-mortgages as well as the fact that households do not tap into housing wealth with age is not consistent with the old-age provision motive either. Notwithstanding, the results are in line with the precautionary savings model which is an extension of the conventional lifecycle model with old-age provision saving motive. The precautionary savings model captures the inherent uncertainty associated with retirement and states that housing wealth is solely used as a means for self-insurance against bad states in later life (Skinner 1989) . Le Blanc et al. (2014) show that the importance of the precautionary savings motive monotonically decreases with age. Hence, an unanticipated increase in the value of housing equity reducing the need for other kinds of precautionary savings, results in a decrease of savings particularly among young and middle-aged, but less so among old homeowners.
Summing up, young homeowners decrease their savings in response to unanticipated house price shocks which is in line with both the basic life-cycle model with old-age provision motive and the life-cycle model with precautionary savings motive. Old households, irrespective of whether they are homeowners or renters, do not react to unanticipated house price changes. 36 This is consistent 35 Note, that there is a broad strand of literature finding evidence that, opposed to the predictions by the basic life-cycle model with old-age provision motive, most of the elderly households do not use up their accumulated wealth after retirement. See Schunk (2009) among others. 36 Owing to the fact that old households are defined as having a household head aged over 40 years, the absence of a response of old households might be the result of an aggregation of the saving effects of the working-aged households (40-65 years) and those who already are in retirement (>65 years). In order to rule out this explanation, we run the baseline regression with the precautionary savings motive only. As we find that 51.6 percent of young and 61.8 percent of old homeowners follow the dynamics on the housing market and perceive changes in housing wealth correctly, we may rule out subjective perception of changes in property values as a driver of our results. 37 Hence, we interpret our results as a first piece of evidence for the precautionary savings model and accordingly, for the existence of a wealth effect in Germany. 38
Robustness analysis

Liquidity constraints
To rule out the existence of liquidity constraints as explanation for the correlation of house prices and saving behavior, in this section we explore the "constraints explanation" in more detail. According to the "constraints hypothesis", house prices and consumption respectively saving behavior are correlated because house price increases generate additional housing equity which can be used for additional borrowing. It is likely that young homeowners are more affected by liquidity shortages since they still have to bear interest and mortgage payments, whereas old homeowners are likely to already have paid off their credit burdens. Therefore, we run the baseline regression for a split sample, namely for low and high liquid households separately, so that we are able to separate the savings responses of households that are less and more likely to be affected by credit constraints. Following Browning et al. (2013) , households with a low level of liquid assets are defined as households with tangible asset holdings less than 1.5 months of disposable income. Accordingly, high liquid asset households are defined as those with equal or more than 1.5 months of disposable income. Estimation results are presented in Table 7 and show that both young low and young high liquid with 3 age groups, where young households are defined as households with a household head aged 40 or younger, middle aged households as having a household head aged over 40 and ≤ 65 and old households as having a household head aged over 65. Results are displayed in Table 14 . The parameter estimates for middle-aged and old households, for both homeowners and renters, are approximately the same, meaning that neither middle-aged nor old households respond to unanticipated changes in house prices. 37 Results reveal that at least some cohorts respond to changes in house prices. Thus, results provide evidence against the behavioral life-cycle model stating that housing wealth is not fungible. 38 The difference with regard to the "conventional" wealth effect lies in the functioning of wealth. Whereas in the conventional life-cycle model with old-age provision motive wealth is used to smooth consumption over the lifetime, in the life-cycle model capturing the precautionary savings motive, housing wealth is held for emergency cases only. Notes: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. ho = homeowners. The models are that of the baseline regression. In column (1), the baseline regression is estimated for low liquid asset households and in (2) for high liquid asset households. A low level of liquid assets is defined as having tangible asset holdings less than 1.5 months of disposable income. High liquid asset households are defined as those with equal or more than 1.5 months of disposable income. Standard errors in parentheses. GSOEP, own calculations.
asset home owning households exhibit a significant sensitivity to unanticipated house price changes. While the fact that young households with low liquid assets react to unforeseen house price shocks is compatible with the lifting of credit restrictions, the fact that young households with high liquid assets also react is evidence against the explanation of liquidity constraints. Hence, the empirical evidence remains ambiguous.
Asymmetric behavior
In the presence of liquidity and borrowing constraints, savings may respond asymmetrically to changes in housing wealth depending on the household's current level of savings. As the empirical evidence considering liquidity constraints is not entirely clear, we also investigate asymmetries in saving responses to house price gains and losses. Estimation results are presented in Table 8 . Specification (1) is our baseline regression without interactions of the price and income parameters with age and homeownership status respectively, but including a dummy which is one in the case of negative house price shocks 39 . As regards the magnitude of the estimated coefficients, we find evidence for an asymmetric response to unexpected house price gains and losses: the estimated coefficient of an unexpected house price loss is substantially larger than that of a gain. However, both the parameter estimate of a house price loss and that of a house price gain are statistically insignificant. The finding of a stronger response to negative price shocks remains unchanged when we additionally control for negative equity (specification (2)). Specification (3) abstracts from controlling for negative equity as negative equity and interactions with the dummy are found not to be significantly different from zero. Instead, the specification interacts windfall gains and losses with age and homeownership status. Again, most of the estimated coefficients in response to surprise losses are larger than those of surprise gains. But given that the estimated coefficients are nearly all insignificant, we are tempted to conclude that asymmetric behavior and hence credit constraints at least are not the main driver of our results.
Further robustness checks
We changed the specification of our baseline regression in a number of ways. The results are reported in Table 9 . First, we perform sensitivity tests with regard to alternative age splits. In our baseline regression, the sample is split at an age of 40 years. In columns (1) and (2) of Table 9 we split the sample at an age of 45 as in Disney et al. (2010) and 50 years respectively. As regards the magnitude and the sign of the coefficients, results remain largely unchanged. However, we find that the parameter estimates become insignificant. Second, following Browning et al. (2013) , in columns (3) and (4), we restrict the sample to homeowners and renters respectively. Again, the parameter estimates become insignificant, but we do not get significantly different results. The only deviation from our main estimation results is that old homeowners now do react in response to unanticipated house price increases: they also decrease their savings but by half the amount young homeowners do.
39 A negative house price shock is defined as a decrease in average house prices between two given years. Notes: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. ho = homeowners. The three regressions investigate the asymmetric behavior between unexpected house price gains and losses. Unlike the regressions before, the parameter estimates of the anticipated house price shocks and its interactions are not reported here. Specification (1) is our baseline regression without interactions of the price and income parameters with age and homeownership status respectively. It includes a dummy which is one if the house price shock is negative. Specification (2) additionally controls for negative equity by including a dummy which is one for households that have negative net wealth and its interaction with the unexpected house price gains and losses. Specification (3) abstracts from controlling for negative equity. Instead, it interacts surprise gains and losses with age and homeownership status. Standard errors in parentheses. GSOEP, own calculations.
Third, in column (5), we again restrict the sample to homeowners and include the perception dummy as control variable in the regression. The results are qualitatively unchanged and the perception dummy is insignificant, confirming that the housing wealth effect is not solely a question of subjective perception. Notes: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. HO = homeowners, R = renters. Model (1) and model (2) perform a robustness check with regard to alternative age splits.
(1) splits the sample at an age of 45 years and (2) splits the sample at an age of 50 years. Regressions (3) and (4) restrict the sample to homeowners and renters, respectively. The regression in column (5) is also restricted to homeowners and includes the perception dummy as control variable. In column (6), we regress expected and unexpected house price changes on an imputed value of total expenditure. In column (7), we use a fixed effects specification to estimate our empirical model. Standard errors in parentheses. GSOEP, own calculations.
Fourth, we change the dependent variable and regress an imputed expenditure measure 40 on anticipated and unanticipated house price changes (column (6)). The sign of the parameter estimates changes in all cases, so that results largely remain unchanged.
Finally, in column (7), we estimate our empirical model employing a fixed effects specification. We find that parameter estimates become smaller and insignificant.
Summarizing, one can say that the results are fairly robust with regard to the magnitude and the sign of the estimated parameters. However, as the saving responses become insignificant in part, we want to recommend caution in interpreting our results and stress that our conclusions have to be confirmed by further analyses.
Conclusion
Demographic shrinkage in tandem with re-urbanization tendencies has led to regional divergent house price developments in Germany. Given that housing wealth and savings are two essential factors of an economy which are strongly linked with economic growth, it is particularly important to examine householdspecific responses in saving behavior to changes in housing costs. For this reason, we investigate the empirical relationship between housing wealth and saving behavior in Germany. Seeing as the augmented life-cycle theory suggests that households should only respond to unexpected changes in both wealth and income, we divide house price and income changes into an anticipated and an unanticipated component respectively. Therefore, we use external regional house price data as an instrument for changes in property prices controlling for additional exogenous determinants influencing the house price and income expectation formation. Using the resulting estimates, we regress changes in household savings on expected and unexpected changes in house prices. Thereby, we allow for heterogeneity in savings behavior across age cohorts and between home-owning and renting households.
We find that households solely respond to unanticipated house price shocks as suggested by the life-cycle hypothesis. Responses to expected house price changes are upon the whole empirically insignificant. We conclude that highly 40 Based on Browning et al. (2013) , total household expenditure in a year is calculated as the difference of total disposable (net) income and savings in that year. Both figures are deflated to 2006 Euro using the CPI. The dependent variable in specification (5) is the first difference of the logarithmic imputed expenditure measure. persistent dynamics on the money market, such as changes in mortgage interest rates, and regional demographic developments, which are used to estimate household's expectations of house prices, are entirely anticipated and that households have already adjusted their saving patterns accordingly. As far as the effects of unexpected house price changes are concerned, we find significant heterogeneity in the savings responses across the considered subgroups: although the effect only exhibits a weak significance, young homeowners react by decreasing their savings. Young renters in contrast do not significantly change their savings. These responses provide evidence in favor of a housing wealth effect in Germany and are in line with either the conventional life-cycle model with oldage provision motive or the precautionary savings model. Old households hardly respond to house price changes which is still consistent with the precautionary savings model, especially if precautionary savings become less important over the life-cycle as recently found by Le Blanc et al. (2014) . Moreover, controlling for household's subjective perception of changes in property values, we find no systematic distortion depending on socio-economic characteristics. Thus, we can rule out subjective perception of changing housing wealth as the driver of our results. This is important as in Germany housing is traditionally seen as consumption rather than as investment good. As we can also rule out competing explanations such as credit constraints as the main drivers of our results, we conclude that the wealth effect is likely existent in Germany, although relatively low in magnitude. The weak results may in part be explained by the relatively small unanticipated changes in house prices. Our data does not cover the whole surge in house prices that lasts until today, and households may not have perceived the changes as a permanent effect. Given the sharp increase in prices since 2012, it would be interesting to redo the analysis as soon as more recent data is available.
Due to the structural change on the labor market we observe a clear trend, in particular for young households, towards urban areas and the big cities, where house prices are high and steadily increasing. In contrast to housing markets examined in previous studies, in Germany the homeownership rate in urban areas is strikingly low, and as a consequence the majority of young households are renters. Moreover, unexpected house price shocks are likely to increase wealth inequality: whereas homeowners experience a gain in their housing wealth, renters loose. As current migration patterns and demographic developments raise the expectation for more and more renters in the big cities, the wealth gap is expected to increase in case of positive house price shocks. In order to counteract these developments, the public could foster homeownership especially for young households in urban areas, for example by using tax policy and providing subsidies for the construction of new dwellings. Assuming that the recent trend in house prices persists at least in urban areas, an increase in the number of homeowners might have a positive effect on the overall growth rate through a stimulation of consumption. Besides, newly built housing equity could serve as additional retirement provision for young households. Notes: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. ho = homeowners. The regression reported in column (4) includes a dummy variable which is one for old households, an interaction term of the income change with the dummy for "old", as well as controls for the interest rate, education and the number of children in the household. The baseline group in this regression is young households. The regression in column (5) is the same specification as in (4) except that the dummy for old is replaced by a dummy which is one for homeowning households. The baseline group in (5) is renting households. The regression reported in column (6) includes a dummy variable which is one for old households, a dummy variable which is one for homeowners, the interaction of both dummy variables, an interaction term of the income changes with the dummy for "old", another one with the dummy for "homeowners" and one with both dummies at once. Again, additional controls are the interest rate, education and the number of children in the household. The baseline group in this regression is young renters. Standard errors in parentheses. GSOEP, own calculations. 
